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A third party access regime changes the nature of a railway track, rendering it less private 
property and more a common property resource.  Indeed, if an access regime is to be 
successful in opening track to competitive entry, it must do this.  If railway track under 
access is a common property resource, it raises the question of how the literature on the 
governance of common property resources might inform the governance of railways in 
support of competition.  This paper explores common property resource governance 
mechanisms used by Australia’s Aborigines in the governance of their land, and finds a 
number of fundamental principles which could be used to assist in governing railways.
 
Introduction 
A third party access regime is intended to open railway track for use by those other than 
its owner.  In so doing, policymakers hope that the monopoly a vertically integrated 
railway company has over rail transport region will be broken, and that above rail 
operators will compete for business, using the railway track to do so on fair and 
reasonable terms of access that are overseen by a regulator. 
 
However, an access regime does more than create competition; it also changes the 
property rights associated with the railway track, transferring some from the original 
owner to the access seekers who now also operate their trains upon the track.  This means 
the nature of the asset changes; it is no longer purely private property, but is in fact a 
form of common property resource (CPR).  If the track and its access regimes are to 
remain sustainable into the longer term, the CPR nature of the track must be reflected in 
its governance.  Otherwise, Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’ may ensue. 
 
This paper focuses on CPR governance mechanisms, and in particular on those used by 
Aboriginal Australians in the management of their most common resource; the land.  
Whilst on the surface, there might be few obvious links between a hunter-gatherer society 
and a railway, in fact the principles used by Aboriginal Australians are quite 
fundamental, and could usefully support competition and third party access.  
 
Section Two of this paper explores some characteristics of CPRs, and asks whether 
railways subject to third party access might be considered as CPRs.  Section Three 
provides a very brief overview of the literature on CPR governance mechanisms, drawing 
out some of the good-governance lessons that have emerged in the literature.  Section 
Four explores governance mechanisms traditionally used by Aboriginal Australians in 
governing the natural resources necessary for their survival.  Section Five then examines 
how the CPR governance principles developed by Aboriginal Australians might be 
applied to railways.  Section Six concludes. 
Common Property 
The property type that is used to describe a particular resource or asset is a function of the 
property rights which are attached to it.  Few resources are truly owned by a single entity, 
with no restrictions on their use, even in a modern economy.  In fact, property rights can 
be highly complex, and often a single resource may have many claimants, each 
possessing a different type of right.  A detailed description of the depth of this complexity 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but Ostrom & Schlager (1992) provide a rather neat 
schema, which highlights different categories of control, and the property rights 




Figure One: Types of Control and Property Rights 
Nature of Right Holder Nature of Right Owner Proprietor Claimant Allowed User 
Access and Withdrawal X X X X 
Management X X X  
Exclusion X X   
Alienation X    
 
An example of an allowed user might be a villager with profit-a-pende rights to resources 
in a forest owned by a feudal lord; she can take plants, but has no rights to determine how 
the forest is managed.  A group of local fishermen might be allowed to lay claim to a 
fishery, after negotiation with a national government, and decide amongst themselves 
how the sustainable yield of the fishery will be divided.  However, they cannot act alone 
(lawfully) to prevent the government allowing others into the fishery, nor can they sell 
the fishery to another party.  Proprietorial rights might be given to a pastoral lease-holder, 
allowing him to operate a cattle ranch on a certain piece of land.  He could determine 
how best to use the land for pastoral purposes, and exclude all others from the land, but 
he cannot sell the land to a third party for a use other than those allowed by the lease.  
Only someone who can exercise all four of these rights can be truly considered to be an 
owner of the relevant resource.  Even in modern economies, such owners are quite rare.  
Certainly, much economic activity can be organised with lesser degrees of control. 
 
The different types of property rights give rise to a typology of resources.  Economists 
often make the distinction between private goods, from which rival use can be excluded, 
and public goods, from which it can’t.  Ostrom (1990), considers a third type of resource 
by adding to the criteria of excludability one of subtractability; whether use of the 
resource by one person takes from the resource something which another party cannot 
use.  Ostrom (ibid) suggests that resources which are excludable and subtractable are 
private resources (like a mining lease), those which are neither excludable nor 
subtractable are public resources (like national defence), and that those which are not 
excludable but are subtractable are CPRs.  Whilst private resources are best held in 
private hands and public resources by the state, CPRs are capable of a mezzanine level of 
governance, often at a local level.  It is this form of governance which this paper suggests 
may be relevant for some railways. 
 
CPRs need can be natural or man-made, and might be privately owned.  An irrigation 
system is often a CPR, as is a car-park provided by a firm for its employees.  In fact, very 
few resources are pure private goods or pure public goods.  The two extremes are rather 
like perfect competition and perfect monopoly; useful concepts to develop theory but 
abstract from real resources in the economy.  Consider national defence and private 
housing, often cited as examples of public and private goods (respectively).  National 
defence is largely non-excludable, but nations exclude some within their midst from the 
protection of the state, expelling or imprisoning them in wartime.  Moreover, although 
one person’s consumption of national defence does not impact another’s, moving the 
army from one part of the realm to another does change the ability of a country to defend 
its borders.  By the same token, a private house is largely an excludable resource, but a 
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homeowner cannot exclude the police, meter-readers or other officials who might have 
need to enter as part of their legal business.  Nor can he cannot exclude the objections of 
his neighbours to the size of his house or noise of his parties.  At the same time, although 
private houses are largely subtractable, they are not entirely so.  In a housing estate with 
many very similar homes, the purchase of one home by its owner precludes others from 
enjoying that home, but if similar homes are located nearby, then arguably, other home-
owners are not prevented from enjoying the same amenities the home provides.  Other 
resources might represent different combinations of excludability and subtractability.  
Conceptually, one might imagine a schema such as that shown in Figure Two. 
 


















In Figure Two, the dotted line represents resource for which excludability and 
subtractability are traded off against each other.  Not all goods need lie along, or even 
near this line.  From the perspective of an upstream user, a river has high excludability (it 
is relatively easy to prevent others from using the river by damming it), but low 
subtractability (use by downstream users does not affect that of upstream users, which 
abstract their water first).  It thus sits in the top left of Figure Two.  By contrast, an 
oilfield nearing depletion might have high subtractability (a gallon pumped by one 
landholder is unavailable to others, and the act of pumping could increase their costs 
substantially), but low excludability (absent of special laws, it is often difficult to prevent 
landowners sinking wells on their land).  Thus, it sits at the bottom-right of Figure Two.  
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Both the oilfield and the river are examples of CPRs.  Between them lies a lens which 
illustrates the notion of CPRs occupying a “middle-ground” between private and public 
goods.  The fuzzy edges of the lens are intended to encapsulate the notion that the 
distinction between a CPR and a public or private good is not always clear.  Indeed, the 
same resource might be governed as a CPR in one jurisdiction, be nationalised in another, 
and be privately owned in a third.  Designating a resource as a CPR is, to a certain extent, 
a social choice rather than purely a technical decision based on the resource’s objective 
characteristics.  However, failure or inefficiency can sometimes result from the wrong 
choice of governance type.  As a final point, a collection of railway types are also shown 
on Figure Two and these are discussed further in the section below. 
Railways as Common Property 
The obvious question to ask is where on Figure Two a railway lies.  The answer depends 
upon the type of railway one is discussing.  A railway like those transporting iron ore in 
the Pilbara, hauling its owners’ ore exclusively and operating where possible at full 
capacity, sits at the top-right of Figure Two.  A commercial railway, providing haulage 
for third parties, is less excludable, as it has to honour its haulage contracts and therefore 
does not always have complete freedom to sell space on its trains.  Nor can it necessarily 
alter its train operating schedule on a daily basis as the owners of the Pilbara railways 
can.  Moreover, if future demand is uncertain and investment lumpy, it may choose to 
operate with some spare capacity, meaning that use of capacity by one customer might 
not necessarily preclude use by another.  Thus, the indicator for a commercial railway is 
further down than that for an iron ore railway, in indication that it is less excludable, and 
elongated into an oval, to indicate that it may be subtractable to varying degrees.  A 
common-carriage railway follows a similar argument, except that the fact that it is 
required by law to haul the freight of all comers reduces excludability still further, and 
may induce more spare capacity to cope with a wider range of unseen demand.  Thus it 
sits lower down than a commercial railway, with a longer oval marking its place. 
 
A railway subject to third party access is different again.  The whole purpose of a third 
party access regime is to reduce excludability.  If it fails to do so, then it cannot support 
competition on the railway and the notion of third party access is a rather empty one.  
However, if a given piece of railway track is at full capacity, a third party access regime 
can also be rather meaningless, for the railway track owner has nothing to sell.1  In fact, 
there should ideally be a fair amount of spare capacity available for sale on a given 
railway track to ensure that enough is available to give new above-rail operators the 
security of tenure they require to incur the fixed costs of establishing their own 
operations.  For this reason, the oval indicating third party access railways is more 
elongated than those above it.  The intersection with the CPR lens indicates that the more 
a railway subject to third party access has spare capacity, the more it becomes like a CPR.   
 
A third party access regime not only moves a railway towards the centre of Figure Two.  
It also introduces some new actors (access seekers and regulators) and changes the 
balance of property rights held by those associated with the railway.  In terms of Figure 
                                                 
1 Policymakers address this issue by requiring access seekers to assist in funding infrastructure provided to 
meet their needs.  This, in effect, provides a way of furnishing the track owner with something to sell. 
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One, third party access seekers have access and withdrawal rights (of slots; which have 
the same relationship to the track as fish do to a fishery).  The track owner has 
management rights over the track, and this means that it is responsible for ensuring that 
its capacity is maintained, and for train management.2  Exclusion rights are shared 
between the track owner and the economic regulator; the former can exclude an access 
seeker who is unable to meet defined safety or similar standards, but the latter acts as an 
arbitrator in disputes between track owners and train operators, with an ability to force 
access.  Alienation is shared between the track owner and government.  In Australia, rail 
was privatised and corporatised with leases over the rights of way rather than their 
outright sale.  Track owners can on-sell these leases to new track owners, as happened in 
Western Australia recently, but they cannot generally close a track and sell the land to 
another user without first seeking approval from government. 
 
If an access regime is successful, and a railway track becomes a CPR, the question arises 
as to how it should be governed in order that it remains a CPR and does not suffer from a 
tragedy of the commons.  The issue of effective governance of a CPR is addressed below. 
Good Governance of Common Property Resources 
Although not the first to examine CPRs, Hardin (1968) ignited the modern debate with 
his famous ‘tragedy of the commons’.  He suggested that, because exclusion was 
infeasible, users of common resources could privatise the benefits of overuse and 
socialise the costs, leading to over-exploitation.  In a fishery, for example, the fisherman 
who catches more than his sustainable share of the harvest this season endangers the 
sustainability of the resource.  However, he gains this season because he has more fish to 
sell.  Since all fishermen face the same incentives, he posited an inevitable pressure 
towards over-exploitation; the tragedy of which he spoke.  Hardin offered two solutions; 
the state could take over the resource and dictate use, or the resource could be privatised.  
Subsequent public policy has often followed one of these two paths. 
 
There is, however, a third option.  Hardin’s model was essentially a non-cooperative 
prisoner’s dilemma game and he was endeavouring to understand what outcomes one 
could guarantee in such a game.  However, resource users do not necessarily play non-
cooperative prisoner’s dilemma games when ascertaining how a resource should be 
governed.  In fact, they avoid such games; realising their futility, they instead co-operate 
and seek solutions which leave them all better off.  Hardin was, in effect, too pessimistic.   
 
This is essentially the conclusion of the very large CPR governance literature which arose 
to challenge Hardin’s conclusions, and found in fact that a defining characteristic of 
human cultural history is that people find ways to cooperate in resource management.  
The literature posits both theoretical reasons why a tragedy need not happen (see for 
example Aoki, 2001, Sethi & Somanathan, 1996 or Anderson & Swimmer, 1997), and 
empirical case studies which highlight cases in which it has not (see Martin, 1989).  
Elinor Ostrom is perhaps the most prominent advocate in the field, and the International 
                                                 
2 Although some access regimes, notably in Europe, separate train management from track ownership. 
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Association for the Study of the Commons (http://www.indiana.edu/~iascp/) the most 
prominent repository of literature associated with it.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to effectively summarise the vast CPR governance 
literature, which is why I focus on Aboriginal Australia in the following section.  
Moreover, as Ostrom (1990) suggests, the field has yet to develop a robust theory of CPR 
governance to match the theory of the state or the theory of the market, which explains 
the circumstances in which CPR governance is demanded and supplied.  However, 
circumstances where CPR governance mechanisms are likely to work successfully have 
been categorised, as have a set of good governance principles.  These are explored below. 
 
Ostrom (2000) suggests that resources which share the following characteristics are more 
likely to be effectively governed via a CPR governance mechanism: 
• Those where feasible improvements can be made. 
• Those where indicators of condition are available at low cost. 
• Those where the flow of benefits from the resource is predictable. 
• Those where the system is small enough that its boundaries can be known and 
internal workings ascertained. 
 
Whilst this list may give small hope to those involved in the climate-change debate, the 
above criteria seem easily satisfied for a railway.  Railway track can support traffic in a 
variety of conditions, and it is usually not technically difficult to improve poor track (the 
economic viability of doing so is a different matter).  Moreover, it is not technically 
difficult to check track quality or calculate track capacity, which shows what flow of 
benefits might be obtainable from it.  Railways can be complex systems, but their 
physical boundaries are clear, and it is usually possible to ascertain how each one 
operates.  Certainly, they are much simpler systems than an ecosystem. 
 
Ostrom (ibid) also categorises the characteristics of stakeholders which support the use of 
CPR governance mechanisms.  These are as follows: 
• The resource itself is important to all parties. 
• The parties have some form of shared vision about the use of the resource. 
• The future is important to all parties (discount rates are low). 
• Trust and reciprocity exist. 
• The parties can write their own rules without being subverted by a higher power. 
• The parties have some management experience. 
 
The stakeholders for a railway track with third party access are usually business-people, 
and can hence be expected to have the requisite management experience, and abilities to 
generate trust and reciprocity, which are both essential for business.  The remaining 
characteristics, however, are less clearly in evidence.  Railway track is not necessarily of 
equal importance to all who use it.  Intermodal shippers, for example, might also have 
access to competing road transport options, and thus be less willing to devote time and 
resources to a CPR governance mechanism.  They are also likely to have a wide variety 
of visions for the future, in common with the different goods which they carry.  Where 
the parts of the chain connected to the railway which they own privately have low fixed 
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costs, which they can amortise quickly, they may not place sufficient importance on the 
future to support a CPR governance mechanism for a railway.  Thus it is not clear that 
CPR governance mechanisms will be universally successful for railways. 
 
However, not all railway stakeholders have shortcomings like those listed above.  Owners 
of mines, dependent upon railways for haulage place great importance on railways.  This 
importance is also likely to be long-lived, given the high fixed costs they have incurred in 
their own mining operations, which would be lost if the railway failed.  Where many 
mines in an area mine the same product, or product all designed for the same purpose 
(export, for example), they are likely to share a common vision.  Thus, railways serving 
these stakeholders seem more likely to be able to develop good CPR governance 
mechanisms for their railways provided they are given the latitude to do so by 
government.3  Such latitude is not always forthcoming, due to conflicts with broader 
policy goals.  In rail, policymakers are concerned about the degree to which industry self-
government could result in a closed shop on a given railway line, damaging competition.  
Thus, where participants in logistics chains have been granted rights to work co-
operatively (such as in the Hunter Valley) and create CPR governance regimes, these 
rights are rather circumscribed, and subject to assessment and frequent validation by the 
economic regulator.  It is not the purposed of this paper to argue whether the potential for 
restraints to competition is worth this intrusion, but it seems unlikely that an industry 
subject to such oversight will develop robust CPR governance institutions by itself. 
 
If these are the situations in which CPR governance rules are likely to arise, what 
characteristics do good CPR governance mechanisms possess?  Ostrom (1990), surveying 
case studies of long-lived (operational between 100 and 1000 years) sets of rules, 
suggests that, whilst it is impossible to speak of “optimisation” in the sense that most 
economic models do, (since there is seldom sufficient information available), it is 
possible to distil the following seven principles of good governance: 
• Clearly defined boundaries: participants need to know what rights they have, and over 
what territory or set of resources those rights exist. 
• Congruence with local conditions: the rules and technology employed need to suit 
local physical and social conditions. 
• Collective choice: those affected by the rules should be able to participate in 
decisions made associated with those rules. 
• Monitoring: the policeman of the system should be accountable to its operators. 
• Gradated sanctions: punishments for minor sanctions should be slight, allowing 
parties that err occasionally to return easily to the CPR governance mechanism, but 
repeated transgressions should be dealt with harshly. 
• Conflict resolution: there must be a means of resolving disputes at the local level. 
• Minimal recognition of organisation rights: higher levels of government should give 
local communities some ability to organise rules, and not subvert the process. 
 
To this, as systems become more complex, Ostrom adds that the systems should be able 
to nest within each other.  Most of the rules hinge upon aspects of poly-centricity; 
                                                 
3 Passenger railways may also exhibit the same characteristics. 
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empowering different jurisdictions with the ability to develop different solutions to the 
problems they face, rather than imposing “consistent” solutions from a bureaucratic 
centre.  Polycentricity, rather than centralisation of decision-making and power is central 
to Aboriginal CPR governance systems, and is one of the key lessons which can be drawn 
from it.  The next section discusses Aboriginal CPR governance mechanisms.   
Aboriginal Resource Management  
Australia’s Aboriginal inhabitants exclusively occupied the country for tens of thousands 
of years prior to white settlement in the late 18th Century.  They lived as hunter gatherers, 
practising ‘fire-stick farming’ (see Kimmerer & Lake, 2001) in an environment where 
careful resource management was crucial for the survival of their society.  The major 
resource which they managed was the land and sea which provided the resources 
necessary for their survival.4  They did so through a sophisticated system of rules, rights 
and obligations surrounding control of and access to resources.  These rules were very 
practical, but deeply rooted in spirituality, and associated with the Dreaming; the central 
Aboriginal creation belief. 
 
It is no more relevant to speak of Aboriginal resource management mechanisms than it is 
to speak of European or Asian mechanisms, for to generalise in this way is to hide a great 
deal of diversity.  It is, however, possible to speak in terms of a few stylised facts, which 
provide a useful way of understanding the approach Aborigines used towards resource 
management.  These facts may be expressed as follows: 
• Land (and sea) is divided into relatively small plots, and inalienable rights to these 
plots were held by a relatively small group, usually an extended family.  The rights 
and responsibilities of each member of the family in relation to that land depended 
upon their status within the family and from whence they had come.  The notion of an 
individual “owner” is less relevant than it is in Western thinking, a fact which has 
bedevilled Native Title negotiations.5 
• Associated with each plot of land are a number of sacred sites, which embody the 
spiritual aspects of the land, and form the constitution of Aboriginal law (Coombes, 
Brandl & Snowdon, 1983).  Associated with each sacred site is a totem (like an 
animal, a plant species, or the rain) which is important to the inhabitants of all 
surrounding plots, and specific knowledge pertaining to the appropriate maintenance 
of that land.  Sacred sites are usually associated with hunting bans and other rules 
which prevent over-exploitation of the resource which is their totem.  This acts as a 
conservation measure, particularly in times of environmental stress.   
• Practical and spiritual knowledge are intertwined, and indeed seen as 
indistinguishable, and thus the appropriate people on each plot of land will know the 
appropriate use of fire to rejuvenate grass, and the appropriate songs to placate the 
                                                 
4 The relevant Aboriginal term is “country”, which has a much broader term than in its standard English 
usage, encapsulating land, sea, air, flora, fauna, (Aboriginal) people currently living on their land and the 
ancestors (historical and from the Dreaming) and descendants of those people.  See Morphy & Frances 
(2006) or Rose (1998) for a more comprehensive definition and discussion. 
5 The Pintupi word is walytja, a word which literally means “one’s own”, and can refer equally to tools, 
family or even oneself.  Its antonym is yapunta, which literally means “orphaned (Myers, 1982).  These 
terms provide a rather neat illustration of how Aboriginal people view property. 
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spirits of the land and ensure bountiful provision of resources.  Moreover, both types 
of knowledge are seen as equally important. 
• Knowledge about a plot of land and its sacred sites is itself sacred, and each 
generation of responsible people must go through a series of initiation procedures to 
learn aspects of the sacred knowledge.  Elders, who possess this knowledge, are 
respected because of it, and deferred to in decision-making.  They also have an 
obligation to share the knowledge, as this sharing is part of caring for the country 
under their care by ensuring that future generations know how to manage it.  Elders 
can, however, generally decide to whom they reveal what information, allowing a 
degree of flexibility which ensures that information is passed to the person who will 
use it to the greatest benefit of the community in the future. 
• No plot of land is sufficient to support its inhabitants all of the time, using only the 
resources on the land.  However, each usually has some resource which is likely to be 
in surplus some of the time, and hence available for sharing with outsiders, whose 
own land may at that time be producing insufficient food for survival. 
• Reciprocity is a social norm of overwhelming importance, and ownership is defined 
by being the person to whom requests for access must be directed, rather than by 
being the person who can preclude access.  Social standing is defined by one’s ability 
to provide something when asked, be it access to land or just a digging stick and each 
request establishes a future obligation for the requester to return the favour, thus 
cementing social ties. 
• Access rights to land are gradated, according to one’s level of knowledge about a 
particular plot of land, and the etiquette of asking for access becomes more formal the 
more distant are the ties between the access seeker and the person who makes the 
decision to grant access.  Aborigines consider themselves “home” when they need 
defer to no-one in their access to land. 
• Ties between people are based upon kinship, a concept which is intimately tied to the 
land of one’s birth; one is who one is because of where one was born and where all of 
the people one is related to were born (Rose, 1998).  Kinship ties are much more 
complex than a modern, Western, nuclear family,6 and they need to be, because they 
define the resources to which one can obtain access outside one’s own home plot. 
 
These stylised facts give rise to a highly complex, interconnected system.  Since land 
holdings are generally too small to maintain food security for its custodians at all times, 
groups need to leave their home ground in order to forage when food available in their 
own plot is scarce.  In fact, most groups spend most of their times living and foraging 
with extended family groups from nearby plots of land, over a range which consists of all 
of their respective plots.  The foraging groups themselves are not fixed, and an extended 
family (or indeed an individual) might hunt and forage with one group of people for one 
season, and another in a different season (Myers, 1982).  Members of each foraging 
group, by virtue of the sacred sites to which they are attached, have responsibilities for 
different resources that are used by all.  For example, members of the “kangaroo clan” 
would be responsible for maintaining sacred sites associated with kangaroo totems, and 
thus ensuring sufficient kangaroos are available for all clans in the region.  This gives rise 
                                                 
6 See Berndt & Berndt (1964) for a detailed taxonomy. 
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to a web of interdependence, and adjacent webs generally overlap such that the whole 
landscape was patterned with networks of interdependence amongst its inhabitants.  
Interdependence was a fact of life in respect of resource management; without it, the 
carrying capacity of the land would have been reduced.  However, Aboriginal people also 
deliberately create interdependence; Layton (1985) discusses the sacred rites of 
Aboriginals in the Northern Territory, whereby one group of people were responsible for 
undertaking the rite and another for deciding when it should occur and for helping in 
preparations.  Since the ceremony was vital for the maintenance of the land, it required 
the two groups to work together.  Practising interdependence in this way ensured that it 
would work as expected when it was necessary for survival. 
 
Interdependence is useful, but unrestricted interdependence can be harmful, because there 
is no structure within which favours can be exchanged and returned.  Ostrom (1990) talks 
about CPR governance making use of a “lattice of interdependence”.  For Aboriginal 
people, kinship ties form the structure of this lattice.  They also create a structure within 
which marriage (a key means of gaining access to resources) can occur and a structure 
within which people can vouch for others as they move further from their lands, or need 
to engage in higher-level co-operation.  The structure is also obviously not limitless, due 
to the abilities of each person to keep track of the relevant ties.  It would thus require 
considerable nesting to operate on the scale of a modern economy.  The Chinese concept 
of guanxi represents an endeavour to do so which would probably have been recognised 
by Aboriginal elders, who also operated overlapping networks.  
 
A strong social norm on sharing and reciprocation lacks the transparency of a market 
with prices where the buyer and seller discharge their obligations towards one another at 
the point of market transaction, and there is no intrinsic tie created.  This is because 
borrowing and lending replace the clarity of prices with the ambiguity of favours which 
might one day be returned (by either the person to whom they were granted, or someone 
else tied to them).  However, in a world of great uncertainty about future conditions, the 
ambiguity of favours might be preferable to the clarity of prices, because the social ties it 
creates between people are a resource that can be tapped in times of future need. 
 
Thus, for Aboriginal people, ambiguity is not troublesome, but fundamental to their 
social intercourse (Myers, 1982).  For example, kinship ties exist at birth, but are only 
activated by the actions of the person concerned and the reaction of others, notably 
elders, to those actions.  The activation of each tie can be a complex process, and 
activation is not always guaranteed.  This allows for flexibility in an otherwise rigid kin 
system, ensuring it can deliver the benefit of patterns of sharing to ensure survival 
through times of environmental stress without trapping people in the pattern.  Ambiguity 
is enmeshed in ordinary life as well.  Aborigines abhor conflict, and thus endeavour to 
avoid situations where one might need to give an answer to a question which could 
provoke an argument.  Thus, when asking for access to land, one would not ask directly, 
but might rather ponder the availability of game in a certain area, within earshot of the 
person responsible for that area (Williams, 1987).  The responsible person might agree 
that game was plentiful, hence giving tacit approval for hunting, or suggest that it is not. 
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The Driving Forces behind Aboriginal CPR Governance Mechanisms 
The CPR governance system devised by the Aboriginal inhabitants of Australia was 
designed to solve an important problem; the low productivity of the land over which 
much of the Aboriginal population ranged and the wide climactic variation which it 
exhibited.  Together, these factors meant that it was not feasible to allocate land such that 
each group could have been self-sufficient within its own range all of the time; the plots 
of land required would have been so large that contact between groups would have been 
minimal, with the attendant dangers of in-breeding and other pressures of isolation.  
Allocating land in such a way that each plot could mostly support its owners, with some 
sharing when each plot produced seasonal excesses of different items,7 as actually a more 
efficient response to the conditions in which Aboriginal people found themselves than a 
regime of pure private property and allows the land to support more people.  Indeed, this 
was inadvertently discovered by white settlers, who did endeavour to divide the land as 
pure private property when they took it from its traditional owners. McAllister, Gordon, 
Janussen and Abel (2006) outline the agistment practices of modern graziers in 
Queensland which (although the authors do not make this comment explicitly) occur for 
the same reasons and in roughly the same fashion as traditional Aboriginal land 
management; cattle are grazed on their own lands most of the time, but graziers make use 
of networks of trust to find pasture in areas where its available when their own lands are 
barren.  McAllister et. Al. (ibid) show how this system achieves better use of the land 
than more centralised solutions such as government drought relief. 
 
As the example of Queensland graziers suggests, Aboriginal people are not unique in 
their land management practices.  Indeed, theirs is a relatively common response to the 
environmental circumstances they faced.  Perevolotsky (1987) notes similar practices 
amongst the Bedouin in Arabia, which he calls “reciprocal altruism”.  Perevolotsky 
suggests this occurs when regional variation in the probability of good resources being 
available in any given season is high, and the costs of excluding others from one’s own 
resources in times of plenty are greater than the benefits of having local forage available 
entirely for one’s own use.  McAllister e. al. (2006) note similar systems in other semi-
arid areas such as Zimbabwe and Niger. 
 
Whilst this is a common solution, it is not the only one.  A modern economist might 
suggest that the market is the best solution; to trade surpluses in times of plenty to ensure 
survival in times of scarcity.  Alternatively, the state might appropriate surpluses when 
and where they occur, and transport them to regions of scarcity.  Huang (1997) outlines 
how this formed an important basis for governance in imperial China.   
 
However, both the market and the state require the development of complex institutions 
which are not necessarily ideal for Aboriginal society.  In Aboriginal Australia, the land 
did not produce sufficient surplus (under the technology then in use) to support a large 
state such as existed in Ancient China.  Moreover, the lack of draught animals, coupled 
with the poor storability of many foods, meant that, whilst trade certainly did occur (in 
                                                 
7 Provided the timing of such seasonal excesses did not coincide, something the Aboriginal people 
managed to avoid over time by adroit management of land boundaries and understanding of the 
reproductive patterns of the resources available. 
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weapons, ornaments and other small, valuable items), it could not have become the basis 
for balancing feast and famine in Aboriginal society.  Since, neither the market nor the 
state would have been particularly effective in Aboriginal society, Aboriginal people 
adopted the sophisticated CPR governance mechanisms outlined above. 
Aboriginal Resource Management and Ostrom’s Principles 
It remains to consider Aboriginal CPR governance mechanisms against the seven criteria 
set out by Ostrom (1990).  Firstly, consider boundaries.  Physical boundaries were well-
known to local residents and to neighbouring groups.  They were generally associated 
with some changes in topography or flora (in Aboriginal minds, with the paths followed 
by their Dreaming ancestors) and were generally more porous in areas with lower 
rainfall, where survival was more dependent upon the ability to range more widely 
(Tomkinson, 1988).  Each local group was also intimately familiar with its own rights 
and responsibilities on its own land, and on the land of those surrounding them.  People 
from father away would be less clear about the rules.  They would know that boundaries 
and sacred sites existed, but not always exactly where they were or what rules were 
associated with them.  Aborigines used this ambiguity (which was inevitable; no person 
could remember all boundaries he was likely to cross in his lifetime) adroitly.   An 
outsider unfamiliar with local rules would know that any mistake would be punished 
harshly, and thus an outsider on land with which he was not familiar had a strong 
incentive to contact the custodians of that land first, and seek their permission for the 
tasks he wished to perform (Altman & Peterson, 1988, Williams, 1982).  In this manner, 
the custodians of the land knew precisely who was on the land, and what resources they 
were taking.  Thus, ambiguity in the minds of outsiders was turned to an advantage which 
could be used in resource management. 
 
Congruence with technological and social conditions was also achieved.  Aborigines did 
not generally produce staple, storable products like grain, and hence groups had to rely 
upon neighbouring regions which had a surplus of seasonal produce in their own times of 
scarcity.  With a lack of draught animals to transport food efficiently, they adopted the 
obvious solution; to move the people to the goods rather than the goods to the people.  
Who moved where was decided within a network of kinship ties which ensured that 
resources would not become overused.  Similarly, as a pre-literate society, Aborigines 
could not write their rules down.  To ensure the rules were remembered, and to ensure 
they had the necessary weight to be followed, they wrapped them in the cloak of religion, 
and made the passing down of such religious lore a primary purpose of those within a 
group who had had the most time to learn and understand it; the elders (Gould, 1982).  
This is a common approach where literacy is low, and can be used to transmit highly 
technical information; Bronowski (1973) shows how monks in Japan used it to preserve 
highly sophisticated sword-making techniques. 
 
Collective choice was exercised via the rights a person had to land.  These are never 
exclusive; usually many decision-makers associated with a particular piece of land, and 
that each person had rights and responsibilities in many lands.  Certain people (usually 
the first-born son of a first-born son) would have greater decision-making rights and 
responsibilities, but others who had passed the requisite initiation rituals might also 
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expect a say in decisions of importance.  How many of these rituals a person had passed, 
and hence how much of the sacred knowledge of a place they knew determined how 
much of a say they had in the governance of that piece of land.8  Social standing was 
determined by the depth of knowledge one had about a particular site, and the breadth of 
sites about which one had some sacred knowledge.  There was thus a strong incentive to 
both collect knowledge, and actively take part in decision-making. 
 
Myers (1982, 1988) provides an illuminating account of the Pintupi people in the 
Western Desert in this regard.  A young Pintupi man is born with his kinship ties in place, 
but not yet activated.  To activate them he travels to the lands of his kin and applies to 
undertake their initiation ceremonies.  Through this process, he ritually imbibes the land, 
and is then authorised to be consulted when decisions are made concerning the land.  This 
not only increases his social standing, but also increases his future family’s security, by 
increasing the network of resources upon which it can rely in times of scarcity.   
 
Monitoring the activities of each group was undertaken through the responsibilities 
associated with sacred sites.  As Rose (1998) explains, each is totemic, and the totem is 
associated with something which provides benefits to a wider community.  Thus, if one 
group does not maintain its site adequately, the consequences will be widely felt, and 
other groups will intervene to see that proper maintenance is performed.  For example, 
the totem associated with a sacred site on one group’s land might be a rain totem, and 
hence this group would be responsible for ensuring through the right rituals, that rains 
were forthcoming.  Another group might be responsible for a kangaroo totem, and hence 
be responsible for ensuring kangaroos were plentiful.  Obviously, from a scientific 
perspective, it is easier to manage kangaroos than it is to manage rainfall.  However, 
Aborigines believed that the spiritual process for ensuring both resources were provided 
in plenty was the same, and in practice, the result of the spiritual knowledge was a very 
practical form of conservation.   
 
Justice and conflict resolution are broad topics, beyond the scope of this paper.  
Eggleston (1976) or Smith (2001) provide more detailed overviews.  Compared with 
Western justice, Aboriginal justice has more of a religious basis, derived from the 
Dreaming, but it also has its system of precedent.  It is administered by the keepers of 
Dreaming lore, the elders.  The focus of its decisions is on maintaining harmonious social 
interactions.   Thus, the presumption is that someone who had committed a crime is 
improperly socialised, and hence needed to be brought back to the “right path”.  This is 
an exemplar of Ostrom’s (1990) 5th principle; people are rarely banished from the “game” 
entirely, but rather justice focuses on making the rules clearer when transgressions 
occur.9  Since the application of law involves a constant rebalancing of harmonious 
social interactions, and since the foundation of law is the timeless Dreaming, the process 
of law seldom allows for any complete resolution of a dispute; an event entering law 
                                                 
8 Tying decision-making rights to knowledge in this way stands in contrast to modern democracy. 
9 This is not to say that banishment did not occur, nor that capital punishment was unknown.  These were 
imposed when socialisation was either clearly impossible, or the damage wrought by the breach was 
sufficiently great that social harmony might be threatened by returning the perpetrator to the fold. 
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often enters lore as well, and can influence social interactions between groups for 
generations.   
 
Two further aspects of Aboriginal law are important for CPR governance.  Firstly, 
through the kinship system, one could always find someone senior to both parties in a 
dispute who could act as a mediator (in fact, several people of differing seniority would 
often become involved). Since the elder(s) viewpoints had great moral authority, they 
were able to defuse situations.  Secondly, it was based upon collective guilt and collective 
harm, which Smith (2001) likens to ripples fanning out from where a stone has been 
thrown into a pond.  Thus, each wrong action creates ‘fields of guilt’ amongst the kin of 
the perpetrator and ‘fields of impact’ amongst the kin of the victim.    This can be useful 
for maintaining social balance.  Fields of impact mean that a strong individual could not 
easily abuse a weaker one, because he would have to contend with the abused party’s 
family if he did, and fields of guilt mean that one could bring shame upon one’s whole 
family through a misdeed, and hence internal sanctions were strong.   
 
The final guideline from Ostrom is not relevant; there was no overarching state Although 
each small clan was part of a larger tribe (Berndt & Berndt, 1964, report roughly 500 of 
the latter at the time of white settlement) these did not perform the same roles as a 
modern state, and were certainly not in a position to enforce their will on a regular basis 
on each of the smaller groupings within them through the use of some form of external 
police force.  It is perhaps this lack of a higher-order state which explains the 
sophistication of Aboriginal CPR governance mechanisms. 
 
It is not clear whether it is entirely appropriate to judge the collective wisdom of a 
thousand generations with the benchmarks developed by one, but from the perspective of 
Ostrom’s seven principles, the CPR governance mechanisms developed by Australia’s 
Aborigines certainly represent good practice.  This is attested to by their long 
sustainability.  It is worth noting that no governance mechanism produced by any other 
culture has exhibited the same longevity, and it is thus apposite to ask whether such a 
system can provide lessons to those charged with governing long-lived assets such as 
railway tracks.  It is to this issue that I turn in the next section. 
Lessons for Railway Governance from Aboriginal Resource Management 
This section explores how lessons from Aboriginal CPR governance mechanisms might 
be applied in the governance of railway tracks.  Examining the previous section 
superficially, if modern economic policymakers could somehow imbue railway track 
owners with the same strong social norm promoting sharing as existed for Aborigines, 
then much of the controversy surrounding access to the track would vanish.  Instead, 
track owners would compete to provide access for the social status it provided.  However, 
such social norms cannot be imposed in isolation.  Instead, one needs to look at what 
drives the norms.  Therein lies the lessons with potentially broader application. 
 
The four key aspects of Aboriginal CPR governance mechanisms which can be translated 
to the context of a modern railway are fragmented ownership, interdependence, different 
gradations of decision rights to a single resource and ambiguity.   
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Fragmented ownership and interdependence should be considered together.  If ownership 
of assets is fragmented, with no further thought about how the fragmented parts might 
interact, it seems unlikely that an effective CPR governance system will eventuate.  
Either the system will require ongoing external oversight, or it will fail.  Consideration of 
interaction between disparate parts requires consideration both of what the parts actually 
do, and what power they give their owners.  Although some disparity in power is 
inevitable, and need not necessarily doom CPR governance,10 it should ideally be 
equalised as much as is practicable to encourage parties to work together.  If this is 
handled adroitly, the system can often produce more than if no interaction occurs. 
 
Aboriginal Australian’s understood these principles, and indeed the carrying capacity of 
their land was enhanced by such a system.  Railways too, have understood it.  In the US, 
Class One railways are able to offer trans-continental services, even thought they do not 
necessarily own track to all of the destinations they serve.  They do so by each having 
track to the destinations they serve most frequently, and then “borrowing” capacity from 
their peers by sharing wagons or granting trackage rights.  Obviously, such arrangements 
are only sustainable if the parties’ net borrowings from each other are close to zero, 
otherwise one party who is consistently seeking trackage rights might either take over the 
party from whom it is seeking such rights, or be taken over itself.  These governance 
systems evolved though more than a century of interaction between railways, often 
without direct government involvement.  However, the US rail regulator, the Surface 
Transportation Board also acts to preserve equality in power, usually between railways 
and shippers, by making acceptance of merger proposals contingent upon their not 
leading to shippers losing the service of competing railways. 
 
In Australia, fragmented ownership of railways has, historically, been associated with 
isolation rather than interdependence; each of the State-owned railways carried goods 
from the hinterland to the main port(s) in each State, and interacted rarely with its peers.  
However, this historical legacy need not drive the future, and policymakers should ensure 
that future asset ownership patterns support interdependence and that rough equality in 
power occurs.  This could provide a basis for good CPR governance mechanisms, which 
are not simply rent-sharing mechanisms, particularly if policymakers consider logistics 
chains as a whole, and how ownership and power are distributed across them.  There are 
obvious issues of economies of density to consider when considering fragmentation, but 
this need not necessarily lead to centralisation as the only alternative. 
 
Although railway track is the asset to which access is sought, it is not the only asset in a 
railway logistics chain.  Different ownership of terminals, port infrastructure or 
maintenance systems may also act to promote the kind of interdependence which 
promotes a competitive industry.  Moreover, it is not necessary to fragment ownership; in 
some cases joint ownership of assets can achieve the same aim.  Lardner (1855) outlines 
how the car pools developed by railways in 19th Century England helped them develop 
sufficient interdependence to offer cross-country services, despite fragmented track 
                                                 
10 See Ostrom & Gardner’s (1993) account of Nepalese irrigation systems for both a theoretical exposition 
and case study example of CPR governance with asymmetric power. 
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ownership.  More recently, in Mexico, privatisation of the rail network into a series of 
geographical monopolies involved joint ownership (by the concessionaires and 
government) of certain key assets critical to the whole system.  Joint ownership of a train 
control system might perform the same role.  The crucial aspect is not necessarily what is 
shared, but how sharing promotes the railways involved working together.  Aboriginal 
people in the Northern Territory deliberately shared responsibility for sacred tasks 
(Layton, 1985), and this assisted in developing the systems of mutual reciprocity, such 
that they worked effectively to share the physical resources necessary for survival. 
 
In some cases, despite the intentions of policymakers, interdependence might be difficult 
to create or sustain.  For example, vertical separation is obviously intended to create 
interdependence between above and below rail operators.  However, if the collective 
demand for track amongst train operators is greater than the amount of track the track 
owner has to sell, then the track owner can play each of the above rail operators off 
against each other to obtain a better price.  Interdependence become dependence, and 
regulation is required to rein in the activities of the track owner. 
 
Where this occurs, the Aboriginal solution of gradated rights and responsibilities may be 
of assistance.  Indeed, this can be viewed as a way of creating interdependence.  The 
same concept is useful in vertically separated railways, but its use is most clearly 
illustrated in the case where railways have been vertically separated.  Gradated rights and 
responsibilities associated with a resource provide a mechanism by which those seeking 
access to it can have a greater say in the decision-making process that surrounds its 
governance.  Whilst premium rights remain with the owner, other users can increase their 
stake in a particular resource.  This is obviously good for the resource user, because he or 
she can thereby play a role in ensuring that the resource is governed in a way which is 
more in line with their own desires for its use.  This can act to mitigate the dependence 
mentioned above, and promote interdependence. 
 
However, perhaps less obviously, it is also useful to the resource owner.  The basis of 
providing more rights in the Aboriginal system is the initiation system; those seeking the 
rights need to make some credible commitments and sacrifices in order to obtain their 
rights.  Aboriginal initiation ceremonies might not be appropriate for railway executives, 
but the principles are.  Those who want to be able to exercise greater rights in relation to 
the governance of a railway track could do so by making some form of costly 
commitment to it.  This might take the form of a requirement to contribute funds for 
expansion (not just for infrastructure the access seeker will use, as occurs at present), or it 
might involve the access seeker allowing the track owner some degree of control over 
that part of its operations which can most effect track condition, like wheel grinding.  The 
point is that mechanisms to impose a cost on having a greater say in managing the track 
provides an opportunity for the track owner to ensure that the dilution of its property right 
is matched by some concomitant benefit, like a sharing of financial risk. 
 
The final aspect which is useful is the Aboriginal use of ambiguity.  Access regimes tend 
to abhor ambiguity, because it can cloak the abuse of market power.  Hence, access 
agreements tend to be quite specific about prices and terms and conditions of access.  
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Provided parties are able to perceive all of the information necessary to write such 
contracts, this is not a problem.  However, when the clarity of the contract gets ahead of 
the information needed to support such clarity, problems arise.  In such cases, less clarity, 
and more strategic use of ambiguity, as Aboriginal people do, might make for better 
access contracts.  This, however, is contingent upon power being relatively evenly 
balanced.  If it is not, then regulatory fears of abuse of market power might be realised. 
 
An example from modern industry is perhaps useful.  There is one petroleum refinery in 
each state of Australia, with the exception of NSW and Queensland, which have two 
apiece.  None of the majors (Shell, BP, Caltex-Ampol and Mobil) has a refining presence 
in more than two states, and transporting refined petroleum between states is costly.  
They thus need to gain access to the refinery outputs of their peers in states where they 
have refining presence of their own.  At the same time, they are (or were) roughly 
symmetric in this need.  They could endeavour to gain access through some complex 
regime which specified price, terms and conditions and so on.  However, this is rather 
cumbersome; it makes little sense for BP to sell a litre of petrol to Shell in WA, and buy 
back a litre in NSW.  Thus, up until 2002, the majors operated a refinery exchange 
scheme, whereby they would effectively swap petrol produced in one refinery for that 
produced in another.  This was more efficient than a formal access contract, with pricing 
and associated contractual conditions.  The agreement dissolved because the WA 
government changed the specifications of fuel sold in the state, and hence the refineries 
were not on an equal footing on cost (WA’s was more expensive to produce). 
 
Railways are not the same as fuel refineries, and some more formal means of control are 
required, if only to stop trains from bumping into each other.  However, the example 
shows that ambiguity (about future fuel needs) can be used to create a better contract, 
rather than being a burden.  Aboriginal social interaction has many such examples. 
Conclusions 
This paper has argued that a third party access regime changes the property rights 
associated with a piece of railway track, making it a CPR.  This occurs regardless of the 
nature of the nominal owner of the track.  Indeed, to be successful, an access regime must 
do this.  If third party access seekers cannot gain some degree of security of tenure over 
the track they wish to use, then they will be ill-disposed to making the fixed cost 
investment their above-rail business requires.  Thus, the degree to which the CPR nature 
of the asset is reflected in its governance structure will be a factor in how well it is 
governed.  This leads one to consider CPR governance mechanisms, and what they might 
bring to the economic governance of railway infrastructure, in support of competition. 
 
Whilst economic regulation is barely a century old, CPR governance mechanisms have 
been part of human history for thousands of years, and there are thousands of examples 
from which one might draw lessons.  In this paper I choose one which has sustained 
Aboriginal people and their environment in Australia for tens of thousands of years; their 
system of land governance.  Superficially, there are few similarities between a group of 
hunter-gatherers using an landscape and a group of railway operators using a railway 
track.  However, as this paper suggests, many of the fundamental notions underpinning 
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CPR governance in Aboriginal Australia could also usefully inform railway governance 
today.  The four which this paper discusses in some detail are fragmented ownership, the 
creation of interdependence, gradated rights pertaining to assets and the use of ambiguity. 
 
Underlying all of these aspects is a different attitude to power.  An unrestricted railway 
track owner has market power by virtue of its control of a monopoly infrastructure asset.  
Modern policymakers endeavour to counteract this power by creating another locus of 
power; the economic regulator.  This can be effective, but requires ongoing, pervasive 
intervention in the industry by the regulator. 
 
Aboriginals treat power rather differently.  Rather than creating a countervailing locus of 
power, they take the power which exists and spread it more widely, creating 
polycentricity.  Polycentricity requires less oversight from the centre, and in the 
Aboriginal case, none at all.  This was born of necessity; Aboriginal technology did not 
produce a sufficient social surplus to allow a central locus of power to develop.  Thus, 
power had to be evenly spread.  However, Aboriginal people were so successful at 
generating polycentricity that for tens of thousands of years, without any form of central 
government whatsoever, they sustainably managed the natural resources of Australia.  
Few other civilisations can make such a claim. 
 
The advantage of polycentricity is that it requires less centralised control over the system 
in which it is used.  In the context of the railways, there would be less need for economic 
regulation, because there would be less of a locus of (market) against which the regulator 
need act.  Polycentricity requires an important change in focus on the part of 
policymakers.  Rather than focussing on the visible consequences of an institutional 
structure which permits the exercise of market power, excessive prices, it requires a focus 
on institutional structure itself, to find a structure in which these adverse consequences 
cannot arise.  This requires policymakers to ask not what they can do to control price, but 
what they might do if price was the one thing they could not control, or alternatively, how 
they might structure the rules of the game such that it did not have to be controlled.  Such 
questions can some only with a change in mindset; policymakers need to think less like 
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